Abstract: Little is known about differences in levels of concerns or preparedness for an avian influenza (AI) pandemic among healthcare workers (HCWs) in different types of hospitals. We compared these concerns and preparedness between 326 HCWs of two community hospitals (CHs) and 908 HCWs from a tertiary hospital (TH) using a self-administered questionnaire between March-June 2006. Response rates were 84.2% and 80.0% from the CHs and TH. Most HCWs (71.6%) felt prepared for an AI outbreak and had significant concerns. They perceive an AI pandemic having adverse impacts on their personal life and work, such as people avoiding them (57.1%). A greater percentage of TH compared to CH HCWs expressed concerns such as feeling their jobs put them at great AI exposure (78.3% vs 67.5%, p=0.012). TH HCWs were more likely to report participating in readiness preparation activities, such as training for infection control (90.0% vs 82.2%, p=0.014) and feel that they (74.1% vs 64.7%, p=0.045) and their hospital (86.8% vs 71.8%, p=0.000) were prepared for an outbreak. Healthcare institutions need to include personal, psychological and family concerns on the agenda and increase participation in readiness preparation activities among HCWs to help prepare for such future crises.
Introduction
Despite significant medical gains of the last century, the danger posed by emerging infectious diseases has become even greater in our increasingly interconnected world 1) . Singapore, an island republic with high standards of environmental hygiene, a comprehensive childhood immunization program, and strict control of imported food and livestock, has not been spared either. Since the 1990s, a number of infectious diseases have emerged and re-emerged in Singapore, such as Nipah Virus infection in 1999 2) , Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) in 2003, and dengue fever in the last few years. The increasing travel and trade within and beyond the region has been a significant contributing factor in this emergence 3) . It has been well documented that healthcare workers (HCWs) suffered from significant stress during the SARS outbreak 4) . As the frontline 'troops', they were, and will be at the forefront of danger in such infectious disease outbreaks. This was seen during the SARS epidemic, where a large Industrial Health 2007, 45, [653] [654] [655] [656] [657] [658] [659] [660] [661] proportion of outbreaks occurred in hospitals and one-fifth of probable SARS cases involved HCWs 5) . Another reason is that in an infectious outbreak, HCWs are more likely to be on physical and emotional overdrive because of an overstretched healthcare system 6) . There is scant data on the differences in levels of concerns or preparedness among different types of hospitals. In Singapore, tertiary hospitals (THs) provide multi-disciplinary acute inpatient care, while community hospitals (CHs) provide intermediate healthcare for the convalescent sick and aged who do not require the care of the THs. With the looming threat of a global avian influenza (AI) pandemic, we decided to study and compare the concerns and preparedness for an AI pandemic among HCWs working in two CHs and a TH in Singapore.
Subjects and Methods
We administered an anonymous self-administered questionnaire to 1,524 HCWs working at 2 CHs and a TH in Singapore, from March through June 2006 (Fig. 1) . The TH respondents comprised all the staff that participated in the respiratory protection program (respirator and Powered Air Purifying Respirators [PAPR] fitting sessions) and who held a wide range of jobs in the TH (n=1,137). At the two CHs, we administered the questionnaire to all HCWs (n=387). Questionnaires were rejected if there were incomplete entries in at least two pages of the questionnaire, no demographic data, unreadable entries, or torn or missing pages.
The questionnaire was developed from an earlier survey used in a study of SARS and HCWs 1) . Participation was voluntary and ethics approval was provided by each hospital's Institutional Review Board.
The questionnaire included items about concerns regarding AI that were work-related (8 items) and nonwork-related (4 items), perceived impact of AI on personal life and work (10 items), and preparedness for AI outbreak at the workplace (16 items). These items were measured on a 6-point Likert scale for responses (strongly disagree, disagree, not sure but probably disagree, not sure but probably agree, agree, and strongly agree). During statistical analyses, we dichotomized this scale into positive response (strongly agree, agree, and probably agree) and negative response (strongly disagree, disagree, and probably disagree). We analyzed the data using SPSS Version 15.0 (SPSS Institute, Chicago, IL). Chi-square analysis was used to compare proportions and test for statistical significance.
Results
Response rate and socio-demographic characteristics (Table 1) Overall, we obtained 1,234 valid responses. 326 HCWs were from the CHs and 908 HCWs were from the TH. The response rate was 84.2% for the CHs, and 80.0% for the TH. The mean age of HCWs was 31.3 yr (standard deviation: 10.7 yr) and the median work experience was 2 yr (interquartile range: 1-7 yr). Females formed the majority in both CHs (83.4%) and the TH surveyed (85.2%). A total of 37.4% of the HCWs were married, and 59.2% were single. There were no differences in both groups regarding feeling more stressed at work, perceived increase in workload and doing work not normally done by themselves. Preparedness for a bird flu pandemic (Table 3) The overall prevalence of perceived preparedness in both groups was high. 71.6% of the HCWs who responded felt that they were personally prepared while 82.8% felt that their institutions were prepared. Nevertheless, TH HCWs were more likely to feel personally prepared (74.1% vs 64.7%, p=0.045) and more likely to report that their hospital was prepared (86.8% vs 71.8%, p=0.000).
Work-related and non-work concerns (
The majority of HCWs had received training for infection control (87.9%); knew the hospital had an outbreak preparedness plan (87.2%) and have been informed of that plan (77.8%). A greater percentage of TH HCWs reported having had training (90.0% vs 82.2%, p=0.014), knew that their institution has a preparedness plan (91.4% vs 75.5%, p=0.000) and were informed of the plan (82.3% vs 65.3%, p=0.000).
In the six months prior to our survey, TH HCWs were likelier to have attended infection control related meetings (59.8% vs 50.6%, p=0.039), received influenza vaccination (82.5% vs 63.8%, p=0.000) and received adequate training in use of personal protective equipment (81.5% vs 71.8%, p=0.032).
Discussion

Demographic factors
Females formed the majority of respondents in both CHs and TH surveyed due to the large proportion of nurses, who are predominantly female in Singapore.
Concerns
As a combined group, CH and TH HCWs perceived a great risk of personal exposure to the bird flu virus from their job and feared falling ill with the disease. This is consistent with a study which found that danger to personal health was one of the most prevalent fears among HCWs who experienced significant psychological stress during the SARS crisis 4) . HCWs are likely to be as, if not more, concerned than the average citizen because they probably have a greater understanding of the associated risks. Fatalities related to SARS among HCWs who were exposed and infected occupationally also contribute to employees' fears regarding potentially fatal infectious diseases 7) . 38.7% of HCWs surveyed had at least 4 yr of work experience in healthcare which suggests that many participants had past experience working during the SARS outbreak in 2003. Moreover, SARS affected all Singaporeans and most HCWs would likely remember and be affected by it as there was much publicity during that period.
A greater proportion of TH HCWs as compared to CH HCWs were concerned of the risk to themselves and those close to them because of their job as a HCW in an AI pandemic. One reason why CH HCWs may be less likely to be concerned is because patients in CHs are likely to have less acute medical conditions. CHs serve as intermediate care facilities which cater to patients who are fit for discharge from acute hospitals (including THs), but require inpatient convalescent and rehabilitative care 8) . They provide the transitional interface between acute hospitals and the community for patients who no longer require the intensive and specialized care provided by acute hospitals, yet are not ready to be returned to the community for medical or social reasons. These are commonly poststroke or post-fracture patients who require rehabilitation and elderly patients who need longer convalescence after acute illness 9) . Thus, patients who are admitted to CHs are 'screened', coming from THs, whereas those admitted to THs come 'unscreened' from the community. Another reason may be that as criteria for admission to CHs, patients who are medically unstable or have medical problems which are inadequately worked up are not discharged to the CHs but remain at the THs. This essentially screens out potential patients ill with AI in an outbreak. Thus CH HCWs perceive themselves to be at less exposure risk compared to TH HCWs.
Despite HCWs' concerns, it is heartening to note that the majority (83.5% of TH HCWs and 89.3% of CH HCWs) would not consider leaving their job but would continue to look after patients during an AI outbreak. This is similar to a study of 60 general practitioners in Australia, in which all of them expressed willingness to provide professional services in an influenza pandemic, citing as reasons strong personal work ethic, a sense of personal responsibility for their patients' welfare, and viewing not working as an abandonment of their responsibilities to their patients and colleagues 10) . However, not all studies have found that HCWs were willing to continue working in an infectious disease outbreak. Qureshi et al. reported that HCWs were less willing to report for duty during infectious diseases epidemics (e.g. SARS, smallpox) than for most other forms of catastrophic disasters (e.g. environmental disasters, mass casualty incidents) 11) . In another study on public health workers, Balicer et al. found that almost half of HCWs were unlikely to report to duty during an influenza pandemic 12) . In a study by Ruderman et al. after the SARS outbreak, healthcare professionals questioned their choice of career and decided to leave their profession and pursue new ventures, showing an unwillingness or inability to care for patients in the face of risk 13) . Reasons for such behavior probably reflect the complexity of the issue of caring for others under conditions of great personal risk. HCWs express conflict between their roles as health care provider and parent, feeling on one hand altruism and professional responsibility and, on the other hand, fear and guilt about potentially exposing their families to infection 14) . Although the majority felt that they should stay, almost half of our respondents (48.1% of TH HCWs and 46.6% of CH HCWs) felt it acceptable if their colleagues resigned out of fear. A possible reason is that these respondents placed the anxiety of their colleagues above their own. Although perceived employer support was a protective factor against stress in other studies 4) , we did not find a significant association in our study. A possible reason is that most HCWs (88.5%) were already confident that their employer will look after their needs if they fell ill with AI.
Perceived impact on personal life and work
Another area of concern we found was characteristic of HCWs dealing with infectious diseases: many respondents felt that they would experience social stigmatization and ostracism, which was also reported in other studies 6) . This was more obvious in TH HCWs who were more likely to fear telling their family about their risk of exposure, feel that people would avoid them or their family due to their job, and avoid telling others about their job nature.
Studies have also found that concern for personal or family health among HCWs was significantly associated with personal or family lifestyles being affected by SARS and being treated differently by people because of working in a SARS-affected hospital 15) . Our results are also consistent with other studies that found that most HCWs have greater stress and workload, work overtime and do work normally done by others during an infectious disease outbreak 1, 4) . A higher percentage of TH HCWs felt that there would be more conflict amongst colleagues at work and the need to work overtime. On the other hand, a higher percentage of CH HCWs felt that there would be adequate staff at the workplace to handle the increased demand. Again, the greater intensity of work and severity of disease of patients in THs probably account for this difference.
Preparedness for a bird flu pandemic
Singapore, together with many other countries, has been developing preparedness plans 16) due to increasing concern of an imminent influenza pandemic worldwide. As a result of the lessons learnt from SARS, Singapore has further strengthened its operational readiness and laboratory safety to respond to SARS, AI and other emerging diseases 3) . Control measures used for SARS have been adapted for use to mitigate the spread of influenza, including infection control measures instituted at healthcare institutions, border health and community-wide measures and quarantine measures 17) . Many health measures are already in place, such as enhanced disease surveillance capability, increased isolation facilities in hospitals and, stockpiles of anti-viral drugs and increasing isolation facilities in hospitals. If required, the Singapore authorities will complement these with border control measures in order to help reduce the spread of influenza to Singapore. Singapore also works closely with other countries and with the relevant world health authorities to monitor and share outbreak information.
These comprehensive preparatory measures are probably the reasons why a high proportion of our HCWs reported themselves and their hospitals being prepared for an AI pandemic.
At the hospital level, infection control activities are in place, including training sessions and related meetings, having a hospital AI outbreak preparedness plan, and informing HCWs of such plans, and training in use of personal protective equipment (PPE). These activities were found to be positively associated with HCWs' personal preparedness for an AI outbreak. This is expected as any activity that imparts knowledge and skills about a disease and its prevention naturally prepares one to better deal with it. TH HCWs compared to CH HCWs were likelier to report having participated in such activities. This may be a reason why they were also likelier to report that they and their hospital were prepared for an AI outbreak.
In contrast, a Canadian study of Ottawa family physicians' preparedness for public health emergencies found that only about a quarter of respondents felt prepared for a respiratory epidemic, with almost half feeling unprepared for an emergency 18) . A possible reason is that respondents in Ottawa have had no first-hand experience of a respiratory infectious disease outbreak as the SARS epidemic in Canada mainly affected the city of Toronto. Singapore, on the other hand, has had first-hand experience of SARS in 2003, with our country having 238 cases and 33 deaths, out of which 5 were HCWs 1) . Greater psychosocial support of HCWs may be required, as suggested by other studies which have concluded that more appropriate psychosocial support is needed to prevent HCWs burning out from overwork and high stress during an infectious disease outbreak 6, 15) . As pointed out by Qureshi et al., the most effective methods to allay fears and concerns for personal safety are probably HCW education, provision of appropriate PPE, and assurance of effective environmental controls 11) . There is a need to put psychological concerns and stresses of HCWs on the agenda when preparing for an AI pandemic because there is a tendency to neglect this area with resources being directed only at alleviating physical morbidity 4) . There were several limitations in this study. There was a lack of qualitative design such as a focus group discussion in designing the questionnaire. We adopted a cross-sectional survey design with self-administered questionnaires. Thus we were unable to comment on any causal relationship between variables studied. Reliance on self-report data has its limitations such as rating bias. However, as stress is an experience based on the perception of a mismatch between demands and resources to meet those demands, subjective self-reporting has its value in such studies. Since we only surveyed one TH and two CHs, our findings may not be generalized to all hospital HCWs in Singapore or to other countries. Nevertheless, it can be expected that HCWs in other parts of the world would share these concerns and stresses.
In conclusion, this study shows that despite the majority of HCWs feeling prepared for an AI outbreak, the majority also have significant concerns such as great personal risk of exposure to the bird flu virus from their job and falling ill with the disease. TH HCWs compared to CH HCWs were more likely to have these concerns and perceive adverse impact of an AI pandemic on their personal life and work, possibly because of the types of patients they are caring for, as compared to CH HCWs. Healthcare institutions need to put these psychological concerns on the agenda and provide effective interventions and greater support for HCWs and their families in such future crises. TH HCWs were also found to be likelier to have participated in readiness preparation activities and this was associated with a greater proportion reporting that they and their hospital were prepared for an AI outbreak. Healthcare institutions should thus organize and provide such activities and ensure that their HCWs participate in such activities where indicated. In the allocation of resources for an AI pandemic, the different levels of preparedness of the type of hospital should be taken into consideration.
